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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s, "junk bonds"' were the curse of Wall Street. The
villains of the 1990s are financial derivatives. Congressman James A.
Leach dubbed derivatives the "wild card" in international finance, 2 while
a Citicorp executive labeled derivatives as the "basic banking business of
the 1990s." 3 In fact, "[i]n all the history of financial markets, no markets
have ever grown or evolved as rapidly as have the derivative markets."4
I Junk bonds are bonds paying an above average interest rate to make up for their below
than average rating. A lower than average rating reflects the possibility that the obligations
under the bond may not be met by the issuer. See RICHARD SAUL WURMAN ET AL., THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING MONEY AND MARKETS 52 (1990) [hereinafter
WSJ GUIDE].
2 Carol J. Loomis, The Risk That Won't Go Away, FORTUNE, Mar. 7, 1994, at 42.
3 Id. at 40.
4 JOHN F. MARSHALL & M.E. ELLis, INVESTMENT BANKING AND BROKERAGE 227
(1994).
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On its face, the threat posed by derivatives seems only to affect
large financial institutions. However, smaller banks, industrial compa-
nies, insurers, pension funds, and municipalities are also at risk.5 Lively
debate in recent legal literature runs the gamut. Current proposals in
legal literature include: (1) no regulation at all; (2) a fine tuning of the
current regulatory framework; (3) less regulation for the sale of deriva-
tives to large sophisticated firms than for other users of these financial
instruments; (4) congressional suitability requirements; and (5) enhanc-
ing the ability of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
to exempt derivatives from regulation.6 Especially in light of proposed
regulations from the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), the is-
sue of derivatives regulation needs to be reexamined.
Following the collapse of Barings PLC (hereinafter "Barings"), the
Orange County bankruptcy, and the Bankers Trust fiascoes which ad-
versely affected Gibson Greetings (hereinafter "Gibson") and Procter &
Gamble (hereinafter "P&G"), government regulators saw these securi-
ties as their new prey. Yet government regulators gave little attention to
derivatives when institutions realized profits. It was only after deriva-
tives contributed to financial crises that government regulators really
scrutinized derivatives trading. An editor of a leading derivatives journal
stated, "[t]he result is uniformed cries for the elimination of all deriva-
tives from portfolios ranging from pensions to university endowments." '7
In addition, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO)
has stated that "U.S. regulatory gaps and weaknesses must be addressed,
especially considering the rapid growth in derivatives activity."'8 If de-
rivative financial instruments have become a bad dream for a few end
users,9 federal regulation as proposed would be an unnecessary
nightmare.
This Note will introduce derivatives, outline congressional and SEC
regulatory proposals, and demonstrate how many of the supposedly
5 Loomis, supra note 2, at 42-43.
6 E.g., Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1993 (1995);
Eric D. Roiter, Investment Companies' Use of OTC Derivatives: Does the Existing Regulatory
Regime Work? 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 271; Geoffrey B. Goldman, Derivatives: Should
Regulators "Punish the Wall Street Hounds of Greed?" 95 COLIIM. L. REV. 1112 (1995);
Jennifer A. Frederick, Note, Not Just for Widows & Orphans Anymore: The Inadequacy of the
Current Suitability Rules for the Derivatives Market, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 97 (1995); William
P. Albrecht, Regulation of the Exchange-Traded and OTC Derivatives: The Need for a Com-
parative Institution Approach, 21 J. CORP. L. 111 (1995).
7 Todd E. Petzel, Introduction to I DERIVATIVES Q., Summer 1995, at 1.
8 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PRO-
TECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 126 (1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
9 End users are the parties using derivatives, such as swaps, to hedge the positions they
have taken in a security. Raj E.S. Venkatesh et al., Introduction to Interest Rate Swaps, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 141 (Atuso Konishi & Ravi E. Dattatreya
eds., 1991).
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needed regulations are already in place or have been adopted by the
many entities targeted by regulators. Furthermore, this Note will argue
that possible future requirements are misguided. Legislation and regula-
tion would not necessarily avoid any of the past failures, nor would they
prevent any in the future. For example, rather than blaming the instru-
ment, regulators should fault inept management, which investors can
hold accountable through private causes of action. Additionally,
although the regulations would mandate disclosure of derivative trading
information, market forces already encourage companies to provide this
information to their investors.
Part I defines a derivative and gives examples of the types of deriv-
atives available on the open market. Part M introduces proposed legisla-
tion and discusses SEC financial statement disclosure releases.
Specifically, by examining past legislation, this paper will demonstrate
why proposed requirements are misguided. Part IV discusses the SEC's
proposed disclosure requirements. Part V introduces notorious deriva-
tives transactions, such as the Bankers Trust relationship with Gibson
and P & G; the bankruptcy of Orange County; and the collapse of Bar-
ings. These disasters and their outcomes buttress the thesis that strict
regulations are already in place, since wrongdoers in these cases suffered
severe penalties for fraud. Part VI concludes by arguing that regulators
should leave derivatives alone because institutional safeguards already
exist.
Although derivatives trading can result in great losses, great gains
are also possible. Increased regulation is in many aspects superfluous in
light of currently available remedies. In fact, the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) has stated that the current regulatory
framework can meet the goals shared by all interested parties.10 In-
creased regulation is likely to stifle the useful function of derivatives in
hedging against the very risks posed by financial markets.
II. DERIVATIVES: DEFINITION AND HISTORY
A derivative is a security whose value depends in some way upon
the values of other more basic underlying securities."1 Derivative finan-
cial instruments have been used for some time despite receiving much
attention only lately. In the United States, municipal financiers in Mas-
sachusetts and later in the Confederate States initially developed deriva-
10 Lynn Stevens Hume, Legislation Needed for Derivatives, Group Says, TiH BOND
BuYEaR, April 15, 1994, Markets at 2.
11 Atsuo Konishi & Ravi E. Dattatreya, Introduction, in THE HANDBOOK OF DRIrvA'nVE
FrNANcIL INsTRUMENTs 1 (Atuso Konishi & Ravi E. Dattatreya eds., 1991).
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tives.12 Today, market participants use derivatives to raise capital, hedge
market disclosure, enhance income, and reallocate investment portfo-
lios. 13 Proposed regulation has focused on four major types of deriva-
tives as outlined by the GAO: 14 forwards, futures, options, and swaps.
15
A. FORWARDS
When two parties enter a forward, they agree that that the holder
must buy or sell a specified amount of an asset or index at a specified
price on a specified date.16 For example, if you enter into an agreement
to purchase a new Land Rover from a British dealership in six months at
a price of £50,000 (roughly $75,000) you may not have that dollar
amount now but know that you will earn it in six months' time. A possi-
ble concern is that the U.S. Dollar will lose its value, and the Land Rover
will cost you more than $75,000. To protect yourself against such an
event, you may enter into a contract with another party to secure an ex-
change rate for that future purpose. The other party to the agreement
may think that the U.S. Dollar will increase in value and that in six
months' time that $75,000 will be worth more than £50,000. The other
party to the transaction is assuming the risk of a devalued U.S. Dollar,
and you will be guaranteed the price of $75,000 for the Land Rover.'
7
B. FUTURES
Similar to forwards, futures also obligate the holder to buy or sell a
specific amount or value at a specified price.18 The difference between
futures and forwards is that a futures contract is generally a standardized
contract, not customized like a forward. For example, a brewery might
need a certain amount of barley on a certain date to fulfill an order for
beer. The brewery could enter a contract to secure delivery of barley on
a specified date for a specified price. The other contracting party, the
speculator, promises such delivery. Should the price of barley drop in
six months, the speculator will profit because he can purchase the barley
at a lower price and sell it to the brewery immediately for a higher price.
Conversely, should the price of barley rise in six months, the speculator
12 See generally Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds, " "General Custer, " and the
Regulation of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. Rsv. 1, 1-18 (1994) for a
more detailed history on derivatives.
13 Mark J.P. Anson, New Disclosure Regulations Proposed by the SEC, DERIVATiVES Q.,
Summer 1996, at 15.
14 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
15 For a detailed description of actual derivative financial transactions, see the discussion
of derivatives trading at Bankers Trust in section V.A of this Note.
16 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 5.
17 See id. at 26 for a similar example.
18 WSJ GUIDE, supra note 1, at 77.
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will lose money since he will have to purchase the barley for a higher
price than what he can sell it for.' 9 Such futures are traded worldwide on
standardized exchanges in Chicago, London, Minneapolis, New York,
Philadelphia, Sydney, Tokyo, and Zurich.
C. OPTIONS
Call options grant the right to purchase, while put options grant the
right to sell a specified quantity of a commodity or a financial asset at a
specified price. Buying a call option allows the purchaser to acquire a
security at a specified price.20 Hence, if the call option holder has the
option to buy a share of General Motors at $50, and if the shares are
trading at a price greater than $50 on the New York Stock Exchange,
then the option holder can make a profit. Conversely, if the option holder
has a put option2' at $50 and the stock is selling below that price, the
option holder can sell the stock at $50 even if the price at which it trades
on the market is lower.
D. SWAPS
Generally, swaps are agreements between counterparties to make
payments to each other at various dates in the future. One widely used
swap transaction is the currency swap, first developed in London in
1979.22 In a currency swap, counterparties may desire each other's ac-
cess to a certain foreign currency. An investment bank typically engi-
neers a currency swap 23 by working out a transactional plan.
Assume that the car dealer of the Land Rover has a strong relation-
ship with a British bank and can borrow £30,000 for five years at a rate
of 8%, while a U.S. company can borrow $70,000 for five years at a
fixed rate of 7%. Assume further that the British manufacturer seeks to
borrow $70,000 for five years but is offered the rate of 10% by a U.S.
bank, and that the U.S. company seeks to borrow £30,000 for five years,
but is offered the rate of 11%. Naturally, the British manufacturer will
want the $70,000 loan offered to the U.S. company, and the U.S. com-
pany will want the British manufacturer's £30,000 loan.
19 For a similar example, see GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 25.
20 ASWATH DAMODARAN, DAMODARAN ON VALUATION 319 (1994). "A call option
gives the buyer of the option the right to buy the underlying asset at a fixed price at any time
prior to the expiration date of the option. The buyer pays a price for this right." Id.
21 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 5. See also DAMODARAN, supra note 20, at 321. "A
put option gives the buyer of the option the right to sell the underlying asset at a fixed price at
any time prior to the expiration date of the option. The buyer pays a price for this right." Id.
22 MARSHALL & ELLIs, supra note 4, at 228.
23 When acting in such capacity, the investment bank is typically referred to as the swap
dealer.
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These parties would be best off entering a currency swap. First, the
British manufacturer would borrow £30,000 and exchange that notional
value24 with the $70,000 borrowed by the U.S. company. Second, the
parties would exchange those amounts with each other. Third, the par-
ties would pay each other's interest rates. Finally, after the five years
they will reexchange the loan principals, and each party will pay the
amounts due to their respective banks.
A "swap effectively exchanges the cash flows that will occur in one
financial transaction for those that will occur in another" financial trans-
action.25 The great advantage of such swaps is that each party has gained
access to a debt market which was otherwise denied. The British car
manufacturer obtained the five year loan of $70,000 at 7% in comparison
to the rate of 10% it was offered by the bank. The U.S. company ob-
tained a loan of £30,000 at a rate of 8% while at best having been offered
a rate of 11% by British banks.
Shortly after the development of the currency swap, the interest rate
swap developed in 1981.26 An interest rate swap entails the exchange of
interest payments. For example, suppose Bank A has an obligation to
pay 8% interest a year whereas Bank B has an obligation to pay a rate
dependent on the London Interbank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR).27 If Bank
A wishes to take its chances and pay the LIBOR rate and Bank B instead
wishes to pay the fixed 8% rate, the banks may exchange payments such
that Bank A would assume the interest rate of Bank B, and Bank B
would assume the interest rate of Bank A. Banks A and B would then be
counterparties.
Bank A ------Pays LIBOR Rate --- >Bank B
< ---- Pays 8% ----------
Derivatives were historically used for hedging purposes to protect
against changes in the value of an underlying security. This purpose has
changed as speculators use derivatives to profit on the derivatives'
changing values. Such speculation has led to increased volatility in the
derivatives markets. 28 Derivatives are now used to obtain better financ-
ing terms, often through the use of currency swaps. 29 They also are a
24 The notional amount "is the amount that is used to determine the actual cash flows
paid or received by applying the corresponding interest rates for the appropriate calendar peri-
ods." Venkatesh et al., supra note 9, at 135.
25 Ian Cooper, Buddy Can You Swap a Dime?, FIN. TiMES (London), February 9, 1996, at
12.
26 MARSHALL & ELLIS, supra note 4, at 228.
27 "LIBOR is the rate of interest charged on interbank loans of Eurocurrency deposits."
Id. at 232.
28 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 25.
29 Id.
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multitrillion dollar market 30 as they have become fixtures in thousands of
corporate portfolios.31 Users of derivatives include securities firms, in-
surance companies, and mutual funds. 32
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION & REGULATION 33
The General Accounting Office believes that, in order to prevent a
"financial shock" reminiscent of the 1987 stock market crash or the sav-
ings and loan crisis, there needs to be heightened regulation. 34 Since
98% of CEOs from the largest companies in the United States plan to
increase or maintain their corporation's use of derivatives, 35 it is no sur-
prise that the effects of derivatives failures have caught the attention of
policy makers.
The House proposed the Derivatives Safety and Soundness Supervi-
sion Act of 1995 (H.R. 31) to oversee derivatives trading.36 The Act,
which never came to a vote, would have required that financial institu-
tions engage in derivatives trading in a "safe and sound manner. ' 37 An-
other proposed requirement was that a "sufficient number" of the
institution's directors be familiar with the risks of derivatives activities. 38
In sponsoring H.R. 31, Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez referred to
the derivatives trading losses in Orange County, as well as those suffered
by Gibson Greetings in its derivatives transactions with BT Securities
(hereinafter "BT"), the securities affiliate of Bankers Trust.39 The Act
would have regulated the use of "Derivative Financial Instruments"40 by
"Financial Institutions," defined broadly to include commercial banks,
30 The 1994 worldwide total of all derivatives contracts was estimated to be approxi-
mately $16 trillion. Loomis, supra note 2, at 43.
31 Id. at 40.
32 Roger M. Zaitzeff, Regulating Financial Derivatives, NAT'L L.J., August 29, 1994, at
B9-B10.
33 The proposed legislation and regulation discussed in this section of the Note occurred
in the 104th Congress, but it was not passed. This Note critiques legislation considered in the
104th Congress on the assumption that future legislative proposals will embody past
suggestions. See Joanne Morrison, Derivatives Industry Will Face Fight To Keep Regulations
Away in 1997; New Derivatives Law May Be In Sight This Year, THE BOND BuYER, Jan. 3,
1997, at 1.
34 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
35 This figure is from a Fortune magazine poll. Terence P. Pare, Learning To Live With
Derivatives, FORTUNE, July 25, 1994, at 108.
36 H.R. 31, 104th Cong. (1995). This bill is very similar to the bill introduced by Repre-
sentative Gonzalez during the 103rd Congress. H.R. 4503, 103rd Cong. (1994).
37 H.R. 31, 104th Cong. § 201(a)(1)(B) (1995).
38 Zaitzeff, supra note 32, at BI0.
39 141 CONG. Rnc. E35-02 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
40 H.R. 31 defines Derivative Financial Instruments as "any qualified financial contract
(as defined in § 1 l(e)(8)(D) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act), and any other instrument,
which the appropriate federal regulatory agency determines to be a derivative financial instru-
ment.' H.R. 31 § (2)(6) (1995).
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savings banks, affiliates of banks, bank holding companies, their subsidi-
aries, and branches and agencies of foreign banks. 41 H.R. 31 would have
required that the appropriate regulatory agencies work together to estab-
lish similar standards relating to capital, accounting, disclosure, risk
management, and suitability for the supervision of financial institu-
tions.42 H.R. 31 merits further attention, as elements from the bill may
be included in future proposals.
A. SUITABILITY REQUIREMENTS
A major concern of legislators is that a financial institution may
suggest derivatives transactions which do not necessarily meet the fiscal
objectives of its customers. H.R. 31 sought to remedy this:
(H) Assurance that, consistent with safe and sound bank-
ing practices, a financial institution does not recommend
or engage in derivatives activities which are inappropri-
ate for a customer of the institution.43
Despite this seemingly simple solution, suitability requirements have
been met with the same opposition as other provisions of the proposed
regulations. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated that there is no need for
such regulation. 44
In particular, industry leaders have questioned suitability require-
ments since they place the burden of bad investment decisions on finan-
cial institutions instead of on the investors who made the bad decisions. 45
Furthermore, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan sug-
gested that suitability requirements interfere with the notion that inves-
tors, sophisticated and unsophisticated, should bear the risk of their
decisions.46 While institutions are not now legally accountable as to suit-
ability, reputations are certainly at stake.
B. SUPERVISION OF MANAGEMENT
Future legislation in the 105th Congress may require, as H.R. 31
did, that a corporation's board of directors closely scrutinize manage-
ment's derivatives trading activities to ensure that the trading be com-
41 Id. § 2(6).
42 Id. § 101(a).
43 Id. §101(b)(1)(H). Suitability requirements are most important when the customer of
the financial institution has limited knowledge of the risks associated with derivative instru-
ments, such as when the broker of the derivative product does not provide enough disclosure to
the investor, who may be an individual or a municipality.
44 Zaitzeff, supra note 32, at B10.
45 The Daiwa Bank of Japan, 1995: Hearings of the Financial Institution and Consumer
Credit Subcommittee of the Banking and Financial Services Committee, 104th Cong., 1 Sess.
(1995) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve).
46 Id.
[Vol. 6:441
DERIVATIVES DISCLOSURE
mensurate with the company's business strategy. H.R. 31 required the
appropriate regulatory agencies to consider:
(I) Effective senior management supervision and over-
sight by the board of directors of a financial institution to
ensure that the derivatives activity are conducted in a
safe and sound matter and are consistent with the board
of directors overall risk management philosophy and the
institution's business strategy.47
While the regulators intended to insure that the board of directors
serves its supervisory role, the regulators seem to expect shareholder ap-
athy. In reality, if the passivity of the board results in great losses, con-
cerned shareholders can vote for a new board. A properly functioning
board should monitor management's activities to meet the duty of care
standard already in place in state corporate law.48
Moreover, the current state of stock ownership partially obviates the
need for monitoring as well. Institutional investors, such as mutual and
pension funds, have a great stake in the current stock market,49 compel-
ling them to be active in a company's affairs. Individual shareholders,
believed to make up this apathetic group, can now look to the behavior of
these institutional investors as guidance. For instance, a mutual fund has
a great deal at stake if it is heavily invested in a company. A mutual
fund which is heavily invested in a particular company can exercise its
influence in two ways: it can buy shares in a company which the mutual
fund believes will prosper, or it can sell its shares in companies believed
to conduct risky derivatives transactions. Individual shareholders are
likely to follow suit.
C. KNOWLEDGEABLE BOARD OF DIRECrORS
Another theme of regulators is that a board of directors of a finan-
cial institution involved in derivatives activities must be informed of the
risks associated with the derivatives activities of that institution, as well
as the credit exposure of the institution with respect to such derivatives
trading activities. H.R. 31 stated in part:
(b) Requirement For Directors-No Financial Institution
may act as a dealer in derivative financial instruments or
as an active end user unless the Board of Directors of
such institution is informed of the risk associated with
the derivatives activities of the financial institution and
47 H.R. 31 § 101(b)(1)(I) (1995).
48 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 125 (1986).
49 Ed McCarthy, Pension Funds Flex Shareholder Muscle, PENSION MorM., January
1996, at 16.
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the total current credit exposure of the institution with
respect to any such activities.50
The shareholders of a corporation elect the board of directors which then
chooses management.5 1 Under rules of corporate governance, the board
must be aware of management's activities. 52 Such reliance on corporate
governance is buttressed by the GAO study itself.5 3 If the corporation
suffers losses from derivatives trading, concerned shareholders might
vote for another slate of directors who would be more likely to oversee
derivatives trading.
Industry leaders have strongly opposed these suggestions, citing the
availability of state corporate law remedies. The possibility of suing the
Board of Directors may seem futile. Nevertheless, in Brane v. Roth,5 4
the directors of the LaFontaine Grain Co-op were found to have violated
the duty of care imposed by state corporate law55 when they allowed the
manager of the co-op to negligently use derivatives to hedge against fall-
ing grain prices. The co-op's accountant had warned that the co-op
should have been trading against risk, and the board of directors ordered
management to do so. Despite the manager's hedging $20,050 of the co-
op's $7.3 million in grain sales, the court found that the board of direc-
tors had a duty to understand hedging techniques and should have moni-
tored management more closely.56
This heightened duty of care standard will have the adverse effect of
discouraging skilled individuals from serving on the board of directors of
the very financial institutions targeted by this legislation.5 7 The directors
most knowledgeable about derivatives might fear they will be considered
"uninformed" by overzealous regulators who will allege that the duty of
care owed the corporation was violated.58
50 H.R. 31 § 201(b) (1995).
51 CLARK, supra note 48, at 106.
52 Id.
53 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 45.
54 590 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
55 The Court applied the duty of care standard defined in IND. CODE § 23-1-2-11 (1987).
This statute has been repealed and replaced with IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (1995) which applies
a less stringent duty of care standard.
56 ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 1993, at 94.
57 Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities and Govern-
ment Sponsored Enterprises: Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 1
Sess. (1995) (testimony of Mark Lackritz, President, Securities Industry Association) [herein-
after Lackritz].
58 Christopher L. Culp & Robert Mackay, Regulating Derivatives, 4 REGULATION 47
(1994).
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D. DISCLOSURE STANDARDS
While H.R. 31's disclosure standards are excessive, they are the
least of its evils. H.R. 31 amended the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to
require that the appropriate federal banking agency demand the disclo-
sure of information regarding derivatives. Much like the current SEC
proposals discussed in the next section, H.R. 31 demanded that corpora-
tions disclose all information about derivatives, including the value at a
fixed time of all derivative instruments, gains and losses from each type
of derivative, and the credit exposure of the corporation for each class of
derivatives when each derivative is about to expire. Legislators feel that
enhanced disclosure would facilitate the decisions of voters during times
when they are electing treasurers in municipalities and boards of direc-
tors in corporations. Derivatives dealers themselves agree with this call
for improved disclosure requirements59 as companies have taken it upon
themselves to disclose derivatives activities in annual reports. 60 This al-
lows blame to be placed on managers as it should be, and not on deriva-
tives as financial instruments.6 1
Although proper corporate governance requires disclosure, accord-
ing to market participants, H.R. 31 would have created inordinate report-
ing burdens.62 In particular, market participants criticize the requirement
of the disclosure of gross notional amounts63 because this is not an accu-
rate measure of value.64 Futures, for instance, are highly leveraged de-
rivatives requiring only a small purchase price as a percentage of their
notional value. This translates into the possibility of earning or losing a
great deal of money on a proportionally small investment. This is not a
great problem for traders using futures for hedging purposes, since losses
on the futures position can be offset by the gains in the underlying as-
set.65 Nor does this present a great problem for speculators who essen-
tially bet on future price movements. Also, requiring the disclosure of
the net exposure with respect to each class of derivatives 66 does not accu-
rately reflect the reduction in risk exposure when all derivative instru-
ments are netted.67 This is especially true when certain derivatives
59 See generally Lackritz, supra note 57.
60 See ANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES, INC., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 67 (1996); XEROX
CORPORATION, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 65 (1996).
61 Jonathan R. Macey, Blame Managers, Not Derivatives, NAT'L L. J., August 26, 1996,
at A19.
62 See generally Lackritz, supra note 57.
63 H.R. 31 § 201 (1995).
64 See generally Lackritz, supra note 57.
65 Sheila C. Bair, Lessons From the Barings Collapse, 64 FORDHAM LAW REv. 1 (1995).
66 H.R. 31 § 201(1995).
67 See generally Lackritz, supra note 57.
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contracts are entered into to reduce the effects of the risks posed by
others.
IV. SEC PROPOSALS
While the future of legislation is unclear, the SEC has proposed its
own disclosure requirements. "Financial Accounting Standard No.
119... requires disclosures" in financial statements concerning amounts,
nature, and terms of derivatives not resulting in off-balance sheet
losses. 68 The current confusion over disclosed information results from
the different disclosure methods used.69 The SEC is attempting to ad-
dress these disclosure issues in the form of releases. 70 The releases sug-
gest two additions: a qualitative disclosure to Regulation S-X71 entitled
Item 4.08(n), "General Notes to Financial Statements," and Item 305, a
quantitative disclosure to Regulation S-K.72
Proposed Item 4.08(n) would enhance the disclosure of derivatives
in three ways. Companies would have to provide clearer information on
the choice of the accounting policy used to account for derivatives.
Companies would have to reveal the impact of their hedging activities.
4.08(n) would also require companies to disclose the impact which de-
rivatives have on their income, cash flow, and overall financial position.
To allow investors to examine the risk posed by derivatives, pro-
posed Item 305(a) would require reporting companies to make quantita-
tive disclosures through tabular presentation, sensitivity analysis, or
value at risk. 305(b) would require the reporting of primary market risk
exposures and the way in which they are managed.
Despite the fact that these proposed regulations would ensure dis-
closure, a Treasury Management Association survey revealed that 50%
of those asked believed the proposals would not improve understanding
of derivative instruments.73 Furthermore, there is a greater cost to dis-
closure, especially where the proposed accounting standards are different
68 Anson, supra note 13, at 16.
69 Id. at 19.
70 61 Fed. Reg. 578 (1995) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210,228, 229, 239, 240, 249)
(proposed December 28, 1995), pursuant to 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(c). See also ALFRED C. AMAN
JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.1.4 (1993).
71 Regulation S-X mandates the SEC's accounting rules for filings and audited financial
statements which the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 require. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE
LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 9.4 (1996).
72 Regulation S-K addresses the way in which relevant information is presented. The
Management Discussion and Analysis section is one of the most important parts of Regulation
S-K. Id. § 3.3.
73 Suzanne McGee, Derivative Dealers Blast Rule Proposals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26,
1996, at C16.
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than the internal accounting standards used by targeted firms. 74 More-
over, this proposed mandatory disclosure scheme of derivative financial
instruments may not necessarily benefit investors. The cost of the disclo-
sure, which investors ultimately bear, might be greater than the value of
having such information. 75
One could argue that managers do not have an incentive to disclose
information unless it is mandated. However, it is in management's best
interests to disclose certain information, especially where investors dis-
count for uncertainty. The less relevant the information which a com-
pany provides, the more the added cost of providing the information will
be reflected in the share price.76 In fact, companies have argued that
financial markets are already demanding the same type of information
that proposed legislation would mandate.77 Essentially, the market does
force companies to weigh the benefits of disclosure against the costs
thereof. 78
V. CASE STUDIES: WOULD THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE?
In introducing legislation, officials often refer to specific events
which they claim could have been avoided with the proposed legislation.
Derivatives losses can be enormous, but causes of action are available
which hold those actors who are in violation responsible. When the pro-
posed legislation is applied to the Bankers Trust debacle, the Orange
County bankruptcy, and the collapse of Barings, the legislation appears
either unnecessary in light of internal controls which are currently being
adopted, or superfluous when compared to laws and regulations already
available.
A. DERIVATIVES TRADING AT BANKERS TRUST
The most publicized corporate losses due to derivatives include
transactions between BT Securities (the securities affiliate of Bankers
Trust) and two companies, Gibson and P&G. These financial disasters
74 Christopher L. Culp & Merton H. Miller, The SEC's Costly Disclosure Rules, WALL
ST. J., June 25, 1996, at A14.
75 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984). Easterbrook and Fischel further this idea that not all
information is worth its production cost by pointing out no one would suggest that investors
benefit if "Chrysler 'disclosed' the contents of its corporate files, down to the purchase price of
each conveyor belt and the details of its bargaining strategy for the next round of negotiations
with employees:' Id. at 695.
76 Anson, supra note 13, at 23.
77 McGee, supra note 73, at C16.
78 Culp & Miller, supra note 74, at A14.
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have fueled much of the proposed legislation.7 9 Nevertheless, BT Secur-
ities did not escape prosecution, which proved to some that actions for
common-law fraud already provided adequate protection.80 Moreover,
those accountable for the debacle also faced the consequences of their
irresponsibility, as one BT executive was fined for BT's derivatives
trading. 81
1. BT Securities and Gibson Greetings
Gibson began its derivatives exposure with BT on November 12,
1991. Gibson and BT entered into an interest rate swap, which Gibson
hoped would reduce the interest expenses it was sustaining on a liability
of $50 million on which it was paying 9.33% interest. 82 The swap would
have allowed Gibson a notional amount of $30 million on which Gibson
would pay BT a fixed rate of 5.91%. The fixed rate payments would
begin on June 1, 1992 and continuing semi-annually until December 1,
1996, when Gibson would make the last payment. BT simultaneously
would pay Gibson the 6-month LIBOR of $30 million.
Gibson ---- 5.91% of $30 million ---- > BT
<---LIBOR of $30 million ----
BT and Gibson entered into a second swap on a notional amount of
$30 million beginning on June 1, 1992. Gibson would pay BT the LI-
BOR every six months, while BT would pay 7.12% of $30 million to
Gibson such that:
GIBSON-----.LIBOR of $30 million ---- >BT
< ---- 7.12% of $30 million-
In the first half of 1992, interest rates fell so that Gibson's payments to
BT were less than the payments BT had to make to Gibson under the
contract. BT and Gibson amended these derivatives in January 1992 and
canceled them on July 7, 1992 with the net effect that BT paid Gibson
$260,000 as a settlement reflecting the decrease in interest rates. 83
Remember, Gibson was concerned with its original $50 million lia-
bility on which it paid 9.33%. Concerned that the market interest rate
79 When Congressman Gonzalez introduced The Derivatives Safety and Soundness Su-
pervision Act of 1995, he directly referred to the SEC and CFTC orders forcing BT Securities
to pay fines in connection with derivatives it sold. See 141 CONG. REc. E35-02 (daily ed. Jan.
4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
80 Judge Feikens of Ohio's Southern District held that the common law fraud claim
against BT could stand. Swaps Defended, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1996, at A14.
81 Laurie Hays, Ex-Bankers Trust Official is Fined in Derivatives Case, WALL ST. J.,
June 12, 1996, at C20.
82 James Overdahl & Barry Schacter, Derivatives Regulation and Financial Manage-
ment: Lessons from Gibson Greetings, FIN. McGmrr., Spring 1995, at 68.
83 Id. at 69.
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would be lower (for our purposes, LIBOR), Gibson would have preferred
to pay the market rate. Taken in the aggregate, the first two swaps en-
tered into with BT were a bet that the market interest rate would
decrease.
Pleased with this result, Gibson entered into a ratio swap, akin to an
interest rate swap in that Gibson's payments would have depended on a
floating interest rate. The parties entered this ratio swap on October 1,
1992 to begin on April 5, 1993 and continue semi-annually on October 5
and again on April 5 of the following year. Until the termination date of
October 5, 1997, BT was to pay Gibson a fixed rate of 5.50% of $30
million while Gibson was to pay BT on the notional amount of $30 mil-
lion multiplied by LIBOR squared over 6%:84
GIBSON ------ [(LIBOR)2/6%] x $30 million ------- > BT
< ----- 5.5% of $30 million ------------
Note that Gibson's exposure to an increase in the LIBOR rate exponen-
tially increases under this swap.
Neither of the above transactions continued until their scheduled
maturities.8 5 The ratio swap outlined above was canceled in exchange
for BT paying $978,000 and entering into another swap.8 6 This process
of canceling swaps and entering into new ones involved a "tear-up" 87
amount which projected the amount that would have been earned by one
of the counterparties. Thus, if Gibson stood to make $10,000 upon the
natural termination of the swap, this amount would allegedly be factored
into the newly entered swap.
When Gibson entered into these new swaps, it relied heavily on the
valuation BT presented. Essentially, BT would value the existing swaps
to determine the "tear up" value. Gibson's complaints centered around
BT's valuation. Once Gibson began suffering staggering losses, it al-
leged that it had been misled by the financial modeling presented by
BT.88 Gibson claimed that BT owed Gibson a duty not to mislead. 89
Conversely, BT pointed out that the agreements entered into did not de-
lineate any fiduciary duty.90 BT argued further that the transactions were
at arm's length and that the valuations presented were meant as contrac-
tual terms: conditions under which BT would enter into new swaps.
The SEC's own findings on this matter suggest that legal provisions
are already in place. The SEC found BT violated of Section 17(a) of the
84 Id. at 76.
85 Id.
86 l at 70.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id
90 Id. at 70-71.
1997]
456 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6:441
Securities Act,91 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,9 2 and Rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder.93 In particular, the conversation between a BT
managing director and his supervisor evidenced fraud94 under provisions
already written into securities laws.
This dispute eventually ended in a settlement on November 23,
1994, in which BT forgave $14 million of the $20.2 million which Gib-
son owed.95 The SEC and the CFTC96 also brought actions. A BT bro-
ker faced charges which ended in a $50,000 fine and a four-year ban
from the securities profession for understating to Gibson the losses actu-
ally suffered, which understatement resulted in Gibson's inaccurate re-
lease of financial statements. 97
As this case illustrates, strict securities laws against fraud were al-
ready in place. Thus, no proposed regulation and legislation would pro-
duce any better protection than current laws against fraud.
2. BT Securities and Procter & Gamble
In a similar charge, P&G alleged that BT traders deceived it by
presenting certain financial modeling which hid risks and which led to
losses of up to $157 million before taxes. 98 These losses were the
amount P&G owed BT under two swaps.
P&G had swapped much of its fixed income debt for a floating in-
terest rate debt in order to take advantage of what it had hoped would be
falling interest rates. Expecting the slide in interest rates to continue,
P&G approached BT suggesting a swap transaction whereby P&G would
benefit so long as interest rates did not rise. After refusing several of the
transactions proposed by BT, P&G settled upon a transaction with BT in
91 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1997).
92 15 U.S.C. 78(j) (1997).
93 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1996). See also In re BT Sec. Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,477 (1995).
94 Id. [ 86,114. The managing director told his supervisor that:
[F]rom the very beginning, [Gibson] just, you know, really put themselves in our
hands like 96%... And we have known that from day one ... these guys [Gibson]
have done some pretty wild stuff. And you know, they probably do not understand it
quite as well as they should. I think that they have a pretty good understanding of it,
but not perfect. And that's like perfect for us."
Id.
95 Richard Waters, US Bank Settles Derivatives Law Suit, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1994, at
30.
96 The CFTC (Commodities and Futures Trading Commission) is a sister institution to
the SEC and has jurisdiction over exchange-traded derivatives. PHILLIPPE JORION, BIG BETs
GONE BAD 119 (1995).
97 Forner Bankers Trust Broker Settles Charges Involving Derivatives, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 1, 1996, at B12.
98 Carol Loomis, Untangling the Derivatives Mess, FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 1995, at 62.
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November 199399 whereby, on a notional amount of $200 million, "P&G
was to pay a floating rate... 75 [basis points] below commercial paper
rates" for the first six months. 100 Following this, P&G was required to
pay a floating rate "dictated by a brain twisting formula whose compo-
nents would include five-year and 30-year Treasury rates as of May 4,
1994."101
P&G---First six months: commercial paper rate -.75; -------- > BT
Next 54 months: rate pursuant to formula -------
< ------------------------- Fixed rate --------------
The effect of this transaction was that P&G would benefit if interest rates
were lower because it was being paid a fixed rate, yet if interest rates
rose, it would suffer.
When interest rates did rise, P&G sued BT. Before the suit, P&G
and BT had entered into another transaction more complex than the first.
The formula agreed upon essentially included a band with boundaries of
4.5% and 6.10%. P&G stood to win so long as interest rates remained
within this band. However, interest rates increased beyond this band.
Acting on an alleged promise from BT, P&G tried to avoid this meteoric
rise in interest rates by negotiating to lock in the rate which it would pay
to BT. Eventually, BT and P&G settled upon a rate, but not before P&G
suffered great losses and BT claimed that it made no promises to P&G.
P&G's treasurer left the company, and CEO Edwin Artzt dubbed the
transactions "a violation of the company's policy against speculative fi-
nancial transactions.' 10 2
Although Artzt said this in hindsight, the assertion does indicate a
company policy against such risky financial ventures. If a company al-
ready has such a policy in place, it is hard to imagine how the proposed
legislation could have significantly protected against what transpired.
Requiring that the board of directors be well-versed in derivatives trading
probably would not have made much of a difference if such transactions
were entered into without the CEO or board's approval. The treasurer
himself would have been deemed well-versed in derivatives if interest
rates had instead taken a turn for P&G's benefit. The litmus test for the
board of directors that one is versed in derivatives trading seems difficult
to apply. Is it the responsibility of the federal government to ensure that
P&G sticks to soap?
99 Id. at 64.
100 Id. at 62.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 66.
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B. ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY-A FATE DECIDED BY VOTERS,
NOT A LACK OF REGULATION
As mentioned above, much of the proposed legislation comes in
response to the bankruptcy of Orange County. Orange County is the
largest municipality in U.S. history to go bankrupt.103 The thought of a
government-run investment pool going bankrupt naturally concerns any-
one whose assets are invested by a government agency. Despite Orange
County's wealth, the derivatives losses have forced it to reduce funding
for programs, including those benefitting children and the indigent. 0 4
Ultimately, the bankruptcy affected all county residents. However, this
does not necessarily mean that increased federal regulation is the answer.
Prevention mechanisms are already in place, such as the crime of fraud
and the democratic election of the county treasurer.
Robert Citron, treasurer of Orange County, ran the Orange County
Investment Pool (hereinafter "OPIC"). The pool consisted of 187 public
entities such as cities, school districts, sanitation districts, and water au-
thorities. 10 5 Citron made many of his investments with the securities
firm of Merrill Lynch. 106 Naturally, as losses were realized by the
county, it began to point fingers at Merrill Lynch.
Citron thought that interest rates would fall. He entered into what
are known as inverse floaters, investment instruments which result in
coupon payments based on the direction of interest rates.' 0 7 Typically,
these instruments are hedging devices that an investor would use if he
had had too many transactions dependent upon high interest rates.
Citron decided to use them as an investment vehicle, betting on sta-
ble or falling interest rates.' 08 These inverse floaters were structured
notes which had become popular in the last few years, especially in 1993,
when investors sought highly bullish investments. 10 9 For example, Cit-
ron invested $100 million in a structured note issued by the Federal
Home Loan Board which was structured so that it would pay 15.5% less
twice the LIBOR rate:
15.5% - 2(LIBOR)
In this calculation, an increase in the LIBOR had a doubling effect. If the
rate went up by 1%, Orange County would feel the pinch of a 2% de-
103 JoRIoN, supra note 96, at 1.
104 Id. at 128.
105 Id. at 7.
106 Id. at 98.
107 This bet on future interest rates is very similar to a swap transaction where the
counterparties are predicting the future of interest rates.
108 JORION, supra note 96, at 77.
109 Lauries Goodman & Linda Lowell, Structured Note Alternatives to Fixed Rate and
Floating Rate CMOs, 1 DERIVATIVES Q., Spring 1995, at 67.
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crease in payments received.' 10 Unfortunately for OPIC and Citron, in-
terest rates increased.
The proponents of H.R. 31 have acted as if only legislation would
have prevented the Orange County debacle. If this had been true, then
the SEC and Orange County could not have brought causes of action
when they did. Orange County has brought charges for lack of adequate
warning and suitability. Mentioned supra in reference to H.R. 31, suita-
bility standards are aimed at protecting the less knowledgeable invest-
ment customers from the more knowledgeable investment institutions.
However, suitability requirements would allow regulators the benefits of
20/20 hindsight whenever the customer loses. The loser of this zero sum
game already scrutinizes the regulatory code in order to have transactions
ruled invalid, suggesting that adequate remedies are already available
without the proposed legislation.
Citron, as Orange County Treasurer, held an elective office.
Throughout his tenure as treasurer, he fought state regulations on his
finance activities, eventually convincing the California state legislature
that certain regulations should be scaled back to give him more leeway.
The voters of Orange County did not give much credence to Citron's
opponent, John Moorlach, in the June 1994 election for treasurer. Moor-
lach severely criticized Citron's risky positions and predicted the losses
which Citron's positions would cause the investment pool to suffer.III
This Note is not trying to suggest that the voters really understood
derivatives and clearly knew of and wanted to take such risky positions,
but that Citron won the election based on his successful record of invest-
ing. Success does not come without risk. While Orange County resi-
dents seemed willing to accept the huge gains, despite the unsuitability of
the investments, they immediately claimed fraud when losses occurred.
To reiterate my point, if Citron violated the law, certainly the county has
a case. However, if he did not violate the law, and if the suitability
provisions had been in place, the county would not initially have made
such tremendous gains.
Citron is by no means above the law nor immune from charges of
fraud. Evidencing that there are regulations which apply to such scena-
rios, the SEC has brought action against Citron. The SEC alleges that, in
1993 and 1994, Citron issued official statements for county bond offer-
ings containing "material misstatements and omissions." The complaint
also alleges that Matthew Raabe, Orange County Assistant Treasurer,
misrepresented OCIP's derivatives holdings by telling rating agencies
that only 20% of the county's portfolio consisted of volatile derivatives
110 JORION, supra note 96, at 51.
111 Id. at 9.
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when derivatives actually made up 27.6% to 42.2% of the portfolio.' 12 If
fund managers such as Raabe are going to misrepresent a fund's holding,
increased disclosure will not solve the problem. As the ISDA has indi-
cated, the current regulatory framework meets the expectations of legis-
lators, regulators, and industry participants." 13
The reason that Orange County declared bankruptcy when it did
was because it did not meet its margin call requirements. 1 4 At the time
of the margin call, Orange County had $800 million in cash, $5 billion in
securities, as well as real estate tax revenues. More importantly, if these
margin requirements were met and Orange County decided to ride out
the storm, the county stood to recover the $21 billion value of its portfo-
lio along with $300 million in interest. County residents would have
made a profit. 115 Simply because the county did not meet its margin
requirements does not necessarily seem to justify massive government
intervention, especially when the county may have come out ahead.
C. INTERNAL CONTROLS AND THE LESSONS OF BARINGS PLC
Proponents of federal derivatives regulation argue that financial in-
stitutions have responded too slowly to the risks to which their activities
expose them. Congressman Leach has noted that while commercial
banks have improved internal risk management controls, other parts of
the industry, such as insurance companies and broker-dealer affiliates,
have not. 1 6 Nevertheless, the February 26, 1995 announcement of the
collapse of Barings motivated other financial institutions to monitor their
employees' derivatives activities." 7 If an institution does not control its
traders and the derivative instruments which they purchase, other institu-
tions like Barings could go bankrupt. Bankruptcy of a financial institu-
tion is a far greater impetus to other financial institutions than is a
congressional mandate.
A single rogue trader named Nick Leeson was able to cause the
collapse of Barings because he had authority not only to execute trades,
but also to take charge of the "back office" which supervises the settling
of trades. Essentially, Leeson placed the trades and was in charge of
112 Andy Pasztor & Bruce Orwall, SEC Accused Orange County of Fraud, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 25, 1996, at B5.
113 JORION, supra note 96, at 37.
114 A margin call is made by a brokerage institution with whom the trade is executed as
insurance that losses sustained can be met. As Orange County stood to lose $1.7 billion, a
margin call was made for the county to put up money as insurance that these losses could be
paid. See JORION, supra note 96, at 36.
115 Rita Koselka, If You Can't Stand the Heat .... FORBES, Feb. 12, 1996, at 37.
116 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Feb. 8, 1995, at A26.
117 John R. Dorfman, Brokerage Firms Take Action to Detect Potential Rogue Traders in
Their Midst, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1995, at C1.
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monitoring himself.' 18 Leeson used derivatives (futures in particular) as
an investment vehicle rather than as a cautionary hedging device.
His positions assumed that the Nikkei average, 119 would fluctuate
very little. He bought futures on one exchange and sold them on another
at a higher price. When the Nikkei average dropped as a fall out from
the Kobe earthquake, Leeson purchased futures on the Singapore Interna-
tional Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) and the Osaka Securities Exchange,
predicting that Japanese stock prices would rise.' 20 Leeson also traded
derivatives contracts on the assumption that Japanese interest rates would
rise. Unfortunately for Leeson and Barings, neither Japanese stocks nor
interest rates rose, and the bank became insolvent paying out hundreds of
millions of dollars to meet margin requirements. 121
Barings ultimately failed because there was no risk management
system looking over Leeson's shoulder. Furthermore, Leeson violated
existing regulations of the stock exchanges on which he was trading.
Leeson pled guilty to these violations as well as to unlawfully deceiving
the auditors at Barings.' 22 For these offenses, he is currently serving a
six and a half year sentence in the Tanah Merah prison in Changi, Singa-
pore.' 23 Leeson's actions caused the British bank to crumble, warning
other financial institutions that, unless they improve internal manage-
ment, they may suffer the same fate. In fact, U.S. regulators, financial
analysts, and large U.S. investment banks have said that the type of
losses suffered by Barings is unlikely in the United States because of
controls already in place.' 24 Hence, legislation is not necessary to stop
rogue traders such as Leeson; the Barings incident will provide an incen-
tive to financial institutions to adopt more stringent controls on their
own.'2 Moreover, while securities firms, exchanges, and regulators can
learn from this debacle,' 26 regulators should be careful not to overregu-
late. They should instead allow securities firms and customers to evalu-
ate the quality of the market. 27
118 JoRION, supra note 96, at 147.
119 The Nikkei average is the average of the leading Japanese stocks.
120 Bair, supra note 65, at 3.
121 Id.
122 In order to hide his positions which were going to result in huge losses for Barings,
Leeson created a secret account (the notorious "8888") which he used to portray to regulators
that he was well-hedged for any losses that may result from those positions. See NICK LEESON,
ROGuE TRADER 269 (1996).
123 Id. at 265.
124 James F. Peltz, Collapse at U.S. Firm is Unlikely Analysts Say, Los ANGELES TiMEs,
Feb. 28, 1995, at DI.
125 Ajoy Sen, Leeson Case to Spur Tighter Financial Unit Controls, REUTERS MONEY
REP., Dec. 3, 1995, at 1.
126 Hans R. Stoll, Lost Barings: A Tale in Three Parts Concluding with a Lesson, 3 J.
DERIVATtVES 114 (Fall 1995).
127 Id at 114.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that derivatives losses can be devastating. Con-
gressional initiatives, however, will not necessarily increase protection,
nor will they act as deterrents to fraudulent behavior any more than the
fraud provisions already in place in securities laws. Conversely, if regu-
lators move away from legislation and towards disclosure requirements,
the SEC must not be overzealous.
Future legislation may require that managers of institutions trading
in derivatives be well-versed in the proper application of derivatives.
Under the traditional corporate governance structure, these mechanisms
are already in place. For example, shareholders can remove the board of
directors which is responsible for ousting management. Changes by in-
stitutional actors 128 already provide a good start to solving past problems.
In short, regulators should leave derivatives alone. End users should
be more prudent in managing risk and speculations with a closer scrutiny
of transactions. Financial institutions have already responded with
tighter internal controls. Furthermore, the great costs to companies of
proposed SEC regulations could actually hurt the entities the regulations
are trying to help. Otherwise, future legislation, if reflective of that pro-
posed in the last Congress, would not prevent the debacles discussed
herein and would create excessive intervention.
Christian 0. Naglert
128 Benjamin Weiser, Six Major Wall Street Firms Agree to Voluntary Derivatives Con-
trols, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1995, at B1. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt welcomed the an-
nounced, confidential internal data reporting by banks as "... a very innovative way at
approaching a serious issue quickly." Id.
t Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 1997. B.A. Skidmore College, 1992.
